An assessment of the  dispute resolution framework in sports Kenya by Kisuu, Samuel  Mwendwa
~ 





AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK IN SPORTS 
KENYA 
Kisuu Samuel Mwendwa 
ADM. No. 072273 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE A WARD OF THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF 
LAWS (LL.B) OF STRATHMORE UNIVERSITY 
STRATHMORE LAW SCHOOL 
FEBRUARY 2016 
' ' '· 
( 
' ·z 
I Table of Contents 
DEDICATION ........ .. .. ...... .... .. ....... ... .... ...... ......... ..... ..... .. ... .. ..... ..... ... .. ........ .. ......... .... ... ... .. ...... 4 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....... .. .. ..... ... .. ....... ...... .... ....... ..... .. ... .... .. .. ....... .. ... .... ... ..... ... .. .. ...... .... 5 
DECLARATION ....... ...................... .. .. ...... .. ......... ....... .... ..... ... .... .... ........ .... .. .... .. .. ... .... ... ..... .... 6 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .... .... ... .. .... ........ ........ ... .. ... ....... .......... ... ...... .......... .... ...... .. .... ... ... 7 
LIST OF CASES ... ..... ... ..... ......... .... ...... ..... ..... ... .. ... ... .... ..... ...... .. ... ... ... .. ...... .... ....... ............. ..... 9 
ABSTRACT .......... .. ... .. .. ......... ......... .. ........ ...... ....... .. .. .... ... .... ..... .... .. .. .... ............ .. ....... .... .... .. . II 
Research Methodology .. ... ...... ..... ..... .... .... ........ ..... ....... .... .... ..... .. .... ... .... .......... ..... .... ....... .. 12 
Chapter Breakdown ..... .... .. ....... ..... .. ........ .... .. .. ... ... .. ....... ....... ... .... .. ...... ... ..... ... .... ... ...... ..... . 12 
CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY .. ... ....... ... ... .... ..... ... .... ...... .... ........ .. ... ....... I3 
Research Objectives .... .... .. ..... .......... .... .. .. ...... .... .. ..... .. .. ... .. .. ... .. .. .. ..... ........... ... ... .. .... ....... ... 14 
Research Questions ... ..... .... ....... .. ... .. ...... .... .... ........... ... ............ .. ...... ........ ............. ... ... ..... .. . 14 
Hypotheses ..... .. .... .. .. ... .... ..... ......... ..... ....... ... ... ........ ........ ...... ....... .. ........ .... ..... ...... .... ..... ..... 14 
Justification for the Study ..... ...... ......... .. ... ... ................ .. ........... ....... ....... ..... ........ ...... .... ..... 14 
Limitations of the Study ..... ... ..... .... ... ..... ............ ..... ..... ......... .. ....... .. ..... ......... ...... ..... ... ... .... I 5 
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW .... ... .... ..... 16 
Introduction ......... .. .. ... .... ........ .. .. .. .... ... .... ... ... .. ....... ..... ........... .. .... ... .. ... ..... .............. ... ....... .. 16 
1. Cultural Relativism ........ .... .... ... .... ... .. ...... .. ...... .. ......... ...... ... ... ....... ......... .. ...... ... ..... ... .. 16 
11. Theory of Justice ... .. ..... ....... .. .. .... .. .. ..... .. .... ............. ... ... ..... .. ... ..... ......... ..... .... ... ..... ...... 18 
Literature Review ......... ...... ...... ...... .... .... ...... ... .......... ... ...... .. .. ....... .... ...... ... ... .. ..... ...... ..... .. .. 19 
1. Access to Justice and the His tory of Sports in Kenya .... ... ..... ......... ................ ...... ... 19 
11. Specific Nature of Sports and its interaction with Law ...... .... ............. .... ....... .... .. 21 
111. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Sports ... .... .. .. ........ ... .. ......... .. ... ..... .... .... ....... 23 
CHAPTER 3 T HE UNIQUE NATURE OF SPORTS AND ITS INTEGRATION INTO 
LAW ..... ... ...... ........ ... ....... ..... ......... .... ........ ... ... ... ..... ..... ...... ... ....... .. .... ..... .... ... ... .... ................. 25 
Sports and its integration into Society ........ .... ... ..... .. .. ........ ....... ....... .......... .... .... .. .... .......... 25 
2 
./ -
From Pastime to Business ..... .... ...... ....... ..... ... ....... ... ... ..... ....... .... ... ... .. ... ... ....... ...... .. ... .. .. .. .. 27 
Why the Legal System Needs to Recognise and Respond to Sports .. ... ... .. ... .. ...... .. ... .. ...... 29 
CHAPTER 4 NATURE OF SPORTS DISPUTES AND ATTEMPTS AT REFORM ... .... .. 37 
Cases before the Sports Act .. ....... ... .. ..... ....... ..... ... ..... .. ..... .. .... ..... .. ..... ... ... ... ... .... ........ ....... . 3 7 
a) Republ ic (through Maurice Odumbe) v Kenya Cricket Association & 2 others .. 37 
b) Isaiah Kiplagat & 2 Others v Eric Keter. .. .. .. ... ... ... .. ... ..... ... .... ........ .... ... .... ... ... ..... 43 
Remedies brought by the Sports Act (20 13) .. .. ...... ..... ........ ......... ....... .......... ..... .... ... .. .... ... . 45 
Definitions ... .... .. .. .... ............... ... .. .... .. .... ... ..... ... .. .... ...... ...... .. .... ....... ........ .. .... ... ... ..... ... .. .. 45 
Estab lish1nents .... ...... .... ........ .. .. ... ... .... .... .. .... .. .. ..... ...... .. .... ..... .... ...... ... ... ... .. ... .. .. .. .... .. .... 45 
The Loopholes ..... .... .. ... ........ .. .... .. ... ... ....... ...... .... ..... ....... ... ... ...... .. ....... .... ..... .. ... ... ......... 47 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... .... .... .. .. .... .. .... .... ........ .. .. .. 48 
Conclusions .. .. .. .............. .. .. .......... ... ... .... ...... .. .. ... ........... .... .. .... ...... .... ...... .... ... .... ..... ...... .. ... 48 
Recoin inendations .. .. .... ... ........ .. .. .... ... .. .. ... .. ... .. .. ....... .... ........... ................ .. ..... .... ....... .. .... ... 49 
Bibliography ........... .... .... .. .......... .......... .... .... ....... .. .. ... .... ... .. ........ .... .. .. .. ... .. ...... .... ...... ....... ... .. 50 
Books ... ... .. ....... ... .... ...... ..... ... ..... .... ..... .. ........ ...... ... ........... ... ..... ...... ... ... ..... .. ... .. .. .... ... .. .. ..... 50 
A1ticles and Conference Papers .. ...... .. .................... .. .. .. .. .... .. .... .. .................... .. .. .. .. .. .... ...... 50 
Website and Blog Artic les .. .. .. ...... .. ...... .. .... ... ........ .. ...... .... .. .. .. ... .......... .. ........ .. .... ........ ...... 51 
3 
DEDICATION 
To God for His Grace during the writing of this dissertation and to my family for all their 




I would like to specially recognise my supervisor, Ms Sarah Ochwada for her unfailing help 
and patience in the compilation of this disse1iation. 
I would also like to acknowledge my father for giving me office space and the provision of 
material to work on this disse1iation. 
5 
DECLARATION 
I declare that this dissettation is my original work and has not been submitted for the award 
of a degree or any other award in any other university. 
Date: 
Kisuu Samuel Mwendwa Admission Numbet·: 072273 
Su pet-visot· 
has been submitted for examination with my approval as University 
Date: ~D\£ I 
























LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
All England Law Reports 
Court of Arbitration for Sp011 
Commonwealth Law Reports 
Chapter 
East Africa Law Reports 
Electronic Kenya Law Reports 
High Comi Civil Case (Kenya) 
International Cricket Council 
Income Tax Act of Kenya 
Judicial Service Commission of Kenya 
Kenya Amateur Athletics Association 
Kenya Cricket Association 
Kenya Law Reports 
Law Rep011s Queen's Bench 
New Zealand Law Reports 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Rugby Football Union of England 
South Africa, New Zealand and Australia Rugby 
Supreme Court Law Reports (India) 




World Anti-Doping Agency 
Weekly Law Reports (England and Wales) 
8 
LIST OF CASES 
Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [ 1971] I All ER 179 
Collins v Wilcock [1984] I WLR 1172 
David Wanjau Muhoro v 01-Pejeta Ranching Limited Cause 1813 of2011 [eKLR] 
Dry Associates Limited v Capital Markets Authority and Another Petition Number 328 of 
2011 [eKLR] 
Enderby Town Football Club v Football Association Limited [ 1971] Ch. 591 
Everett Aviation Limited v Kenya Revenue Authority Income Tax Appeal 2 of2009 [eKLR] 
Fall v Hitchen [1973] I All ER 368 
George Kamau Ndiritu & Another v Intercontinental Hotel Cause 2347 of2012 [eKLR] 
Giella v Cassman Brown [1973] EA 358 
Isaiah Kiplagat & 2 Others v Eric Keter Civil Application 239 of2000(Court of Appeal 
Decisions of Kenya, 3rd Ed 2000) 
James Mwarari Gatome & 7others v R Civil Application 25 of2007 
Lee v Showman 's Guild of Great Britain [ 1952] I All ER 1175 
Mclnnes v Onslovv Fane [ 1978] 3 All ER 21 I 
R v London &Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] All ER 19 
R v Kenya Cricket Association & 2 others ex-parte Odumbe Miscellaneous Application 1723 
of2004 [eKLR] 
R.D. Shelly v The International Airport Authority of India and Others [ 1979] I SCR I 042 
Republic v Rand [ 1966] I LR QB 230 
Rootes v Shelton [ 1967] 116 CLR 383 
Topi Flora Limited vJoel Odhiambo C ivil Appeal207 of2006 [eKLR] 
9 
Whittaker v Minister of National Insurance [1966] AllER 537 




This study is carried out on the background of the many disputes in spotis in Kenya. The 
study takes an athlete-centred approach owing to the fact that they are the most affected 
patties in the event of a tussle. The first chapter sets out a basic background by which 
disputes occur in Kenya. It also introduces the elements that will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
The theories of cultural relativism and justice have informed my assertions about the avenues 
explored in dispute resolution in sp01ts in Kenya . There is a study of two landmark cases, 
before the enactment of the Sports Act (20 13 ), which show institutional attitude towards 
dispute resolution as well as the coutt ' s analysis of the decisions. The Spotts Act attempts to 
mitigate the issues that arise from these cases though there are various legal technicalities by 
which the Act fails to fully canvas the issues that arose from the decisions. 
Chapters 1-4 are more of informative chapters with decisions, articles and statistics and very 




For this research topic, I intend to rely on both primary and secondary methods. 
Primary sources shall include, but not limited to, available statistics, The Constitution of 
Kenya (201 0), relevant legislation and subsidiary legislation. 
Secondary sources shall make references to case law, scholarly writings, and credible 
newspaper mticles. 
Chapter Breakdown 
1. Background to the Study 
2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
3. Unique Nature of Sp01ts and Its Integration into Law 
4. Nature of Sp01ts Disputes and Attempts at Reform by Sp01ts Act (20 13) 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Disputes in sports in Kenya are a common occurrence 1 and are also a hindrance to the 
development of the industry. This is due to different standards and legal principles being 
applied by the courts in deciding cases2.Furthermore, seeking redress from the ordinary 
comis to settle disputes in spmis has not only retarded the development of sp011 but led to the 
disputants ignoring the com1 process and those with a lower bargaining power (usually the 
athletes) are forced to accept the sanction as it is; more often than not leaving the sport 
especially in a non-professional setting3 . 
The Kenyan Sports Act4 of 2013 is a relatively new piece of legislation and it attempts to 
remedy this issue by establishing a tribunal for the arbitration of sports disputes under 
Section 56. The jurisdiction of this tribunal is limited to specific disputes (this is canvassed in 
the analysis of the Act in Chapter 4) and therefore the following enabling section, Section 60, 
is also confined to this jurisdiction of disputes. 
Due to the nature ofsports5, disputes may arises from different scenarios and different parties 
including but not limited to Players v Clubs, Clubs v Federations, Sponsors v Players/C lubs 
over various issues including disciplinary issues, contract issues and national team selection 
issues . According to Professor Wekesa, all sports bodies have set up an elaborate mechanism 
of dispute resolution which normally involves arbitration at two or three levels ; first at the 
club level , and then at the federation/union leve l, recently the Sports Act has adopted a 
National Tribunal and the highest level being the Court of Arbitration for Spmi(hereinafter 
CAS)6. The aims of this study are to assess the current dispute resolution framework for 
sports in Kenya, and to assess suitability of e laborate institutional Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (hereinafter ADR), as contrasted with traditional litigation as a means of dispute 
resolution . 
1 Wekesa M. Towards a Sport Jurisprudence in Kenya I !vlount Kenya University Law Journal (20 12) 19. 
2 Further elaborated 
3 Wekesa M. Towards a Sport Juri sprudence, 19 
4 No. 25 of20 13 
5 Chapter 3 
6 Wekesa, Towards a Sport Jurisprudence in Kenya, 25 
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Research Objectives 
The following are my research objectives: 
• To assess the nature and the autonomy of sp01t and to demonstrate the need for 
specialised dispute resolution mechanisms for the same. 
• To assess some of the landmark disputes prior to the Sports Act. 
• To demonstrate the suitability of internal and institutional ADR framework laid by 
the Sports Act. 
Research Questions 
The following are my research questions : 
• Should disputes in sports be categorised separately in the Kenyan legal system? 
• Is internal, ADR a better alternative to litigation in sports? 
Hypotheses 
This study is built on two hypotheses 
• Sp01ts is a unique discipline and ought to recetve distinct recognition 111 a legal 
system 
• Dispute resolution mechanisms are the key to the development of sports. 
Justification for the Study 
This research is relevant in that it intends to investigate the best means possible to resolve 
disputes in sp01ts. The Constitution provides that everybody is entitled to fair administrative 
action and the access to justice.7 In light of this, the Constitution also provides for the use of 
ADR mechanisms such as reconciliation, mediation, arbitration in order to settle disputes8 . 
These mechanisms are different in procedure and possible outcome and therefore there is a 
need to scrutinize whether ADR mechanisms are better suited as compared with the 
traditional judicial process. 
7 Articles 4 7 and 48 respectively, Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0) 
8 Article 159{2), Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0) 
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This study is of utmost importance to the sports sector in Kenya-which has been riddled with 
disputes for time immemorial-due to the fact that sports is shifting from a mere pastime and 
evolving to become a lucrative business as well as a means of livelihood . 
Limitations of the Study 
The integration of spmis law as a unique branch of law has not been done in the Kenyan 
legal system . Only one University in Kenya, Strathmore University, offers Sports Law in 
their curriculum. The Sports Act is a new piece of legislation and is facing various 
implementation hurdles like the Spmis Dispute Tribunal Rules and Registrar's Rules are yet 
to be implemented more than 2 years later after the promulgation of the Spmis Act. Due to 
the above reasons, there is a limited amount of research, formal scholarly or academic work 
on the subject in Kenya. This dissertation is for the partial fulfilment of a Bachelor of Laws 
degree and hence I am subject to a word limit. 
15 
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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Introduction 
This study seeks to juxtapose the theories of cultural relativism and justice, contextualise 
them with regard to sp01is, the disputes that arise from sports and the outcomes that are 
essential to the maintenance of the environment created by sports. 
i. Cultural Relativism 
Cultural relativism is the theory that suggests that good and bad are re lative to culture9 . The 
theory can be divided into two parts; strong cultural relativism and weak cultural relativism . 
Strong cultural relativism indicates that culture is the principal source of moral right and 
wrong this is not the same as radical cultural relativism which holds out that culture is the 
sole source of moral judgment. Weak cultural relativism holds that culture may be an 
important source of the validity of a moral right or rule . In a bid to measure these forms of 
cultural relativism across a continuum one must not only use a quantitative measure-in that 
the number of subscribers of a patiicular way of life is a conclusive determinant-but also 
incorporate qualitative measures where the substance of the practice is assessed and an 
objective judgment is made. 
Cetiain aspects of human anthropology develop from a way of life i.e. culture. John Finnis 
speaks about play being one of the basic goods in human life. Just like the other 6 basic 
goods, (life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness) play is 
developed within a cultural context10 . The importance of sport in national culture is a global 
phenomenon despite varying intensity and institutional significance 11 • 
To further demonstrate this idea that sports is a cultural construct, tn order for a 
soccer/football player and a samba dancer to be considered 'good' they must display jogo de 
9 Tilley J, Cul tural Relativi sm, 22, Human Rights Quarterly. (2000), 501 
1° Finnis J, Nalural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1980, 87 thi s assertion is furthered in 
Chapter 3 
11 Black D. and Nauright J, Rugby and the South African Nation: Sports, cultures and power in the new and old 
South Africans, Manchester University Press, 1998, I 
16 
cintura which directly translated from Portuguese means 'waist game' 12 • A contextual 
translation offered by Lopes is the body's ability to provoke fascination and for this reason 
Brazilian football has acquired the identity of 'samba football' 13 . This identification of 
Brazilian football with dance is not a mere creation but an appreciation of cultural 
differences 14 • 
This depiction of cultural significance on sp01t is not umque to the Brazilians. A more 
controversial example and closely knit to this theory of cultural relativism is the evolution of 
Rugby Union in South Africa. Rugby Union in South Africa has held and continues to hold 
significant prominence among the white population of South Africa who are the architects of 
the modern sporting structure in South Africa 15• The coloured population of South Africa are 
less inclined to play rugby for various reason including this socio-cultural demographic 16 • 
The two divisions of the theory of cultural relativism (strong and weak), as opposed to 
radical relativism, also recognise the existence of universality based on circumstance. Spotts 
bodies have grown to global entities outside conventional public authority and in time have 
created their own rules 17 and also depend on the conventional legal system to buttress the 
authority of these rules . This theory is important to legislative bodies as they incorporate 
sp01ts into the legal system in that the solutions and provisions.suggested by any law (which 
includes provision for dispute resolution) meant to govern sports are better provided by those 
actively involved in both sports and law 18• 
This theory is also an important indicator for the judiciary to consider in that it cannot afford 
to ignore violations of natural justice and human rights because they are outside the realm of 
sports dealings. The following chapters show how the coutt covered its eyes basing it on 
private dealing whilst the principles of natural justice were being flouted. 
12 A vai I ab le at https ://translate.google.com/? ie=UTf -8&h l=en&cl ient=tw-ob# auto/cn/ j ogo%20de%20cintura 
18/ 11 /2015 
13 Leite L, Successes and Contradictions in 'Multiracial 'Brazilian Football in G Armstrong, R Giuliano/fi (eds) 
Entering the Field. New Perspectives on World Football. Berg, Oxford , 1997 
14Eduardo P. Archetli , Anthropology of Sport, Universi ty of Oslo, 3 
15 Black D. and Nauright J, Rugby and the South African Nation: Sports, cultures and power in the new and old 
South Africans. I 
16 http: //www. theguard ian.com/sport/20 I 5/scp/ I 0/spri ngboks-not-racist- insists-head -o !'-so uth-african-rugby-
oregan-haskin s 18/ I I /2015 
17 Wekesa M, Towards a Sport Jurisprudence, 21 
18 Sec Lord Denning dictum in Enderby Town football C lub Ltd v. Football Association Ltd [ 1971] Ch. 591 
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ii. Theory of Justice 
John Rawls 19 contends that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of 
systems of thought"20 . Rawls continues to state that men in their being understand the 
concept of justice and that disagreement is usually due to the fact there is no congruence as to 
the principles that should govern their associations. For this reason, societies are seldom 
well-ordered for what is just and unjust is usually in dispute.21 
In Mcinnes v Onslow Fane22 Megarry V -C states: 
"Justice is jar from being a "natural" concept. The closer one goes to a state 
of nature the less justice does one find. Justice, and with it natural justice, is 
in truth an elaborate and artificial product of civilization which varies with 
different civilizations." 
John Rawls gives a very hypothetical analysis of what justice is whereas Megarry VC 
conceptualises a practical theory of justice; that indeed it is a dictate of the circumstances of a 
particular civilization; a live indicator to the theory of cultural relativism being related to the 
theory of justice. 
Dispute resolution 111 sports is usually, at first instance, occurs through internal tribunals 
coined by the various sports organisations. There lies the risk of the organisation being 
prosecutor and judge denying the athlete his right to natural justice. 
19 Former Professor at Harvard University 
20 Rawls J, A The01y of Justice, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999 at 3 
2 1 Rawls, A The01y of Justice, 5 
22 1197813 i\11 ER211 at219 
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Literatm·e Review 
This literature review will be divided into 3 parts: 
1. Access to Justice and the History of Sports in Kenya 
11. Specific Nature of Sp01ts and its Interaction with Law 
111. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Sports 
1. Access to Justice and the History of Sports in Kenya 
Article 48 of the Constitution provides that access to justice is a right for all and that the State 
shall promote it. The cou1t in Dry Associates Ltd v. Capital Market·s Authority & 
Another23 defines access to justice as, 
" ... a broad concept that defies easy definition. it includes: 
I . the enshrinement ofrights in the law; 
2. awareness of and understanding of the law; 
3. easy availability of information pertinent to one's rights; 
4. equal right to the protection of those rights by the law enforcement 
agencies; 
5. easy access to the justice system particularly the formal adjudicatory 
processes; 
6. availability of physical legal in.fi·astructure; a.ffordability of legal 
services; 
7. provision of a conducive environment within the judicial system; 
8. Expeditious disposal of cases and enforcement of judicial decisions 
without delay. " 
Justice David Majanja in this decision, concedes to the fact that the concept of access to 
justice is a difficult one to put a finger on . However, he tries to construct a foundation by 
which one can attempt to conceptualise it. In this construction, the first aspect of the list is a 
23 Petition 328 of2011 
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matter of serious debate; the enshrinement of rights in law as it is or as it should be? Does 
that negate the creation of rights in personam for example in contract law? Each of these 
elements shall be expanded and contextualised to the topic of study. 
Kariuki proposes that, "for this constitutional right of access to justice to be realized, there 
has to be a framework based on the principles of: expedition; proportionality; equality of 
opportunity; fairness of process; party autonomy; cost-effectiveness; party satisfaction and 
effectiveness of remedies. "2./ These principles when focused upon imply the application of 
subjective standards in order to achieve access to justice. 
Historically, the resolution of disputes in sports has been fairly inconsistent with little or no 
regard to the rights of the athletes .25 Athletes have found themselves facing their 
organisations that possess a dual capacity of adversary and adjudicator i.e. the organisation 
prosecutes the matter and judges or appoints the panel of judges26 . For instance, the former 
Kenya Amateur Athletics Association (KAAA) (now Athletics Kenya) in clause 21 (ii) of its 
constitution prior to review stated: 
"All disputes between KAAA and any athlete shall be submitted to an 
arbitration panel appointed by the KAAA Executive Committee. The decision 
of the arbitration panel under this section sha/1 be final and binding on all 
parties. No right ofappeal" 
This for a long time was the norm within spotting organisations and unions. In R v. Kenya 
Cricket Association & 2 others Ex-pat·te Maudce Odumbe, Maurice Odumbe, was 
suspended for violation of ethical regulations in the Cricket Code of Conduct. At first 
instance the tribunal was set up by the Kenya Cricket Association (KCA) and the 
International Cricket Council (ICC) . Upon their finding and subsequently suspending the 
player, Odumbe applied to the court for judicial review proceedings seeking an order of 
certiorari to quash this decision . The court declined this application on the grounds that the 
24 Muigua K, !-!era/ding a New Dawn: Achieving Justice through effective application of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms (A DR) in Kenya, The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Kenya, I, 2013 , 43-78. 
25 Mew G & Richard s MJ , iV!ore Than Just a Came: Resolving Disputes in Modern Sport presented at 14th 
Commonwealth Law Conference, London, England, 2005, 3 
26 See R v. l<cnya Cricket Association & 2 others (Ex-parte Odumbe) 
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ICC and the KCA were not public bodies. This example depicts how the athlete had no 
recourse to an independent adjudicator; a form of imputed bias and ultimately a violation of 
natural justice. This pm1icular case is analysed further in Chapter 4 
The Sp011s Act in Section 59 attempts to remedy this anomaly as it states: 
"The Tribunal shall determine-
a. appeals against decisions made by national sports organizations 
or umbrella national sports organizations, whose rules specifically 
allow for appeals to be made to the Tribunal in relation to that 
issue including -
i. appeals against disciplinary decisions; 
ii. appeals against not being selected for a Kenyan team or squad; 
b. other sports-related disputes that all parties to the dispute agree to 
refer to the Tribunal and that the Tribunal agrees to hear; and 
c. appeals from decisions of the Registrar under this Act. 
However, upon careful reading of this section that highlights the jurisd iction of the Tribunal , 
one sees that the only way the Tribunal may be accessed is if the rules of the sp011s 
organisation allow for disputes to be referred there. One does not need a special eye for detail 
to see that there is still a gap retarding the access to justice by athletes. 
ii. Specific Nature of Sports and its interaction with Law 
In order to determine the nature of anything, one has to understand how it came to be. Brasch 
in his writ as to how sports began states, 
"Sport was a natural result of a universal love of play and man's innate desire to 
compete with and to excel, if not dominate, others. Another mainspring of sport was 
man's need effectively to defend himse(f his tribe and, later on, his country. In panic 
and fear when escaping from danger, he learned to run, jump and swim. To avoid 
defeat or to subdue opponents, he invented archery, judo and karate. And in order to 
be ready for combat, at all times he practised them and new sports evolved out of his 
martial training. Even football and baseball carry vestiges of battles between tribes ... 
21 
... Sport thus assumed even cosmic significance. Definite rules in primitive ball games 
were religiously observed to direct the winds, the bringers of life. The two teams 
represented earth and sky and as no one would dare to cheat the gods, an umpire was 
unnecessmy. No wonder that primitive man believed that sport, if not divine itself, 
was a giji of the gods. He was firmly convinced that 'to play the game' meant to 
accelerate the revival of nature and the victory of vegetation. The association of 
games with religious worship continued from prehistoric times well into the classical 
period. "27 
On a similar wavelength, John Finnis writes that play is one ofthe six aspects of human well-
being. He contends that it is a large and irreducible pati of human culture and is enjoyed for 
its own sake. Play can be incorporated into any human activity, even the drafting of 
enactments but is always distinguishable from its serious context. 28 
The sports industry has evolved into a worldwide multi-billion enterprise contributing to 
approximately 2% of England's economy and employing approximately 400,000 people.29 
With this growth in the discipline, there is need for specific codification and formalisation for 
the protection of the subjects from exploitation. 
Professor Gardiner argues that, 
"It is true to say that [sports /av.'} is largely an amalgam of interrelated legal 
disciplines involving such areas as contract, taxation, employment, 
competition and criminal law but dedicated legislation and case law has 
developed and will continue to do so. As an area of academic study and 
extensive practitioner involvement, the time is right to accept that a new legal 
'0 area has been born -sports law. "J 
Professor Catier in proposing that spmis law is an independent corpus of law states: 
"A field becomes a field not because it is inherently so but because in our 
public dealings we shape it as such, defining the concepts and legal norms 
27 Brasch, R, f-low Did Sports Begin? ( 1986), Sydney : Angus and Robin son. 1-5. 
28 Finn is .1 , Natural Law and Natural Rights. 87 
29 https:l/www. sportenglancl .org/rcscarch/benelits-of-sport/economic-value-of-sport/ on 5 March 2014 
30 Gardiner S ct al , Sports Law, 4. Routledge, 2012, 71 
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that will prevail uniquely in that context. It becomes a field because enough 
people with power on all sides are so affected by it to require some special 
treatment of it in law"31 
This proposition directs that indeed sports law is umque 111 its constitutive elements. The 
nature of sport as a form of play has evolved into an economic enterprise as has theatre and 
art. Affirming John Finnis, indeed codification is required but attention needs to be paid not 
erode the nature. This research partly seeks to critique the legal framework as it is with 
regard to dispute resolution in sports. 
iii. Altemative Dispute Resolution and Sports 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) refers to the decision-making processes with regard to 
conflicts other than litigation.32 ADR mechanisms include early neutral evaluation, 
negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration .33 ADR prides itself for being a simple, 
quick, flexible, and private and an accessible dispute resolution system compared to 
litigation . It emphasises a win-win situations for both parties, is cost effective and 
maintains/fosters relationships between the parties.34 
ADR mechanisms can be classified as can be classified as the facilitative , evaluative and 
determinative. A facilitative mechanism is one where the main role of the third pmiy is to 
lead the disputants towards a solution e.g. mediation and conciliation. Moreover, the third 
party may assist the parties to identify issues that may arise in the course of the process and 
point them out to them and also offer recommendations without carrying out an evaluative 
role. In an evaluative mechanism, the third party, upon consideration of the evidence and the 
nature of the dispute, offers advice to the parties on a possible outcome and makes a non-
binding decision. A determinative mechanism, like arbitration, is where the third party 
evaluates the dispute and makes a determination which is usually bind in g. 35 
31 Carter B W, What Makes a "Field" a Field? Social Science Research Network. 1999 available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2351495> accessed 2 March 2015. 
32 Kariuki M and Kariuki F, A DR. Access Jo Justice and Development in Kenya. Strathmore Annual Law 
Conference, 2014, 3 
33 https://www.law.cornell.cdu/wex/a ltcrnati vc_dispute_resolution on 5 March 2015 
34 Kariuki M and Kariuki F, ADR. Access to Justice and Development in Kenya. 4 
35 X ie Z, The Facilitative, Evaluative and Determinative Processes in A DR, 20 I I. available at 
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There are quite a number of ADR processes and there are similar to one another, so how to 
identify an appropriate process to a particular dispute in various ADR processes is highly 
important with respect to the dispute and the intended outcome.36 
With regard to sports, Greenberg states, "Professional sp011s have not been immune to the 
recent proliferation of alternative dispute resolution methods. In fact, the use of alternative 
dispute resolution processes has become the norm within the professional sporting arena."37 
Arbitration, in particular, is the most commonly used mechanism of dispute resolution. 38 
Arbitration is a final and legally binding process.39 Due to the speed, informality, privacy, 
and finality of the arbitral process, it is often less costly than the process of I itigation and the 
potential for appeals is lessened 40 . Arbitration as a determinative mechanism of dispute 
resolution is not suitable to all disputes as not all disputes are necessarily antagonistic and a 
simple direction by a third party may resolve it.41 Most sports organisations have provided 
for arbitration as the only means of dispute resolution due to the finality of the arbitral award 
and ability to seek for its enforcement including at the highest level which is CAS.42 
Greenberg in writing on ADR in sports facility leases, states that most sports facility leases 
mandate that the pa11ies must first mediate the dispute before subjecting the controversy to 
arbitration . This is allows the parties to settle the dispute in good faith and therefore maintain 
their relationship and its privacy. 43 
http: //www.xwqlaw.com/info/c47f5ffl5b464882ad5c9a7f97338652 on 5 March 2015 
36 Xie Z, The Facilitative, Evaluative and Determinative Processes in ADR. 
37 Greenberg M, The Stadium Game, 2, Marquette University Press, 200 I, 532. 
38 Greenberg M, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Sports Facility Leases, 16 Marqueffe Sports LalV Review. 
2005 . 100 
39 Section 32A, Arbitration Act (Cap 49 Laws of Kenya) 
40 Greenberg M, Alternative Di spute Resolution in Sports Facility Leases, I 03 
4 1 Xie Z, The Facilitative. Evaluative and Determinative Processes in A DR. 
42 Prof Wekesa, Towards a Sport .Jurisprudence in Kenya, 25 
43 Greenberg M, Alternative Di spute Resolution in Sports Facility Leases, I 03 
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CHAPTER 3 THE UNIQUE NATURE OF SPORTS AND ITS 
INTEGRATION INTO LAW 
This chapter seeks to investigate the growing body of sports law locally. It also seeks to 
justify why the legal system (from legislation to contractual practice and more impotiantly to 
this study, dispute resolution mechanisms) ought to accept this growth . To do this, 
conclusively, a scope of what sports is in itself; its nature , its integration into society as a 
form of play and its growth into a lucrative business and what this means (or should mean) to 
law needs to be assessed . 
Sports and its integration into Society 
The Sports Act defines sports to include, 
"all forms of physical or mental activity which, through casual or organized participation, or 
through training activities, aims at expressing or impt·oving physical and mental well-
being, forming social relationships ot· obtaining •·esults in competition at all levels , and 
includes any other activity as the Cabinet Secretary may, from time to time and after 
consultation with the technical department responsible for spotis, prescribe;44 " 
This definition is definitely not pulled from the sky it may be inferred from how sports 
4 -
began . Rudolph Brasch ) states, 
"Sport was a natural result of a universal love of play and man's innate desire to compete 
with and to excel, if not dominate, others. Another mainspring of sport was man 's need 
effecti vely to defend himself, his tribe and, later on, his count1y. In panic and fear when 
escaping from danger, he learned to run, jump and swim. To avoid def eat or to subdue 
opponents, he invented archery, judo and karate. And in order to be ready for combat, at all 
times he practised them and new sports evolved out of his martial training. Even football and 
baseball cany vestiges of battles between tribes ... " 
Man's love for play is a basic aspect of his well-being hence the natural inclination towards 
it46 . The performance could be individual or social albeit informally, highly structured or in 
44 Section 2 
45 The author was a rabbi and an author. Officer or the Order or the British Empire and Member or the Order of 
Australi a 
46 finn is .1 , Natural Law and Natural Rights, 87 
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an ad hoc pattern47 . Due to this play may be demonstrated at a simple social level e.g. 
between age-mates in the school yard, in an amateur though competitive setting or at a 
professional level governed by a global federation thereby depicting a taxonomical look at 
sports in society. 
The interpersonal nature of play then dictates that for it to have meaning, the athletess must 
be aware of the rules and the aims of the game48 . The scoring of points was as a result of 
primitive ways of counting and an separate individual would be the one to settle the 
differences; now known as the referee/umpire49 .This is the first or most basic level at which 
the evolution of law in sp01ts begins; the existence of rules and a separate decision maker. 
Where rules exist, there is need for incentive to follow the rules; the offender cannot be 
accorded similar treatment as the non-offender50 . In sports, and I will illustrate with rugby, 
offending teams are penalised and depending on severity of the offence the individual athlete 
receives a sanction 51 . 
This law applies at a communal level, among those playing the game, viewing it from a bird's 
eye view; as an individual in the larger society, isolated from the happenings in the field they 
adopt a quasi-legal form i.e. in so far as they are rules backed with a sanction, there is no 
authority to compel their obedience. This can create the problem of athletes (who also live in 
the larger society) to disregard the rules of the game hence the need for authority of the rules 
and the rule maker. This asse1tion has been exemplified in the sport of rugby. The Rugby 
Football Union of England (hereinafter RFU) passed regulation to prevent the payment of 
rugby athletes52 . This was at the time the administrative body that governed the spo1t of 
rugby in England therefore the regulations (which include the rules of the gameplay and the 
administrative rules for clubs and sub-unions) it passed would be applicable and enforceable 
by them in England. At that point there was no law within the English legal system 
prohibiting a parallel administrative body to be formed . It was thus, in 1895, that the 
47 Finnis .1 , Natural Law and Natural Rights, 8 7 
48 Anthony .1 . Celano, Play and the theory of basic Human Goods American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 28, 
No.2(Apr. , 1991) 
49 Brasch, R, !-low Did Sports Begin, 6 
5° Fuller L, Anatomy oft he Law (1968), Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. , 15 
5 1 Law 10.5 of World Rugby Laws provides for the admoni shing of, showing of a red or ye llow card to a player 
offending Law I 0 which is on foul play. 
52 http ://www .en ~ l a nd ru~bv .com/t wi ckenhamiwt,rld -ru !!bv-museum/rugbv-h istorvit hc-ama t.:ur-era/ o 
18/01 /2016 
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N01thern Union split and formed a parallel administrative body for rugby (now rugby 
league). 
From Pastime to Business 
The initial data for this section of the chapter shall be a basic timeline of how rugby' 3 
evolved from an amateur sport to a professional sport and finally a look at global and local 
statistics for sp01ts. 
Rugby, as we know it, began in England at Rugby School. Initially it was a game played by 
the middle class of England but gained popularity amongst the working class54 . In 1886 the 
RFU) at an Annual General Meeting passed strict laws preventing the payment of rugby 
players55 . As the sport grew and spread, there was pressure for the members of the RFU to 
keep the best players despite maintaining amateurism hence clubs would make illegal 
payments to athletes in cash or in kind 56 • The pressure of professionalism finally 
demonstrated itself in 1895 when there was a split between the RFU and the Northern Union 
and the sport of Rugby League57 was born in Northern England which eventually spread to 
New Zealand and Austra1ia58 . The International Rugby Board (as it was then known) was 
dominated by the English who maintained this standard of amateurism for 100 years since 
the split of rugby codes59 . In late 1994 the, rumours began to circulate that media tycoon 
Rupert Murdoch was intending to finance a breakaway professional league (to play rugby 
league) for elite rugby union players; millions of dollars had already been exchanged for 
players to switch codes after the 1995 Rugby World Cup60. It was the threat of the demise of 
rugby union that the game turned professional allowing South Africa, New Zealand and 
53 The sport or rugby is chosen as an example due to the pressure for its conversion from strictly amateur to 
professional. It is also a very good example of how sports became a lucrative business and how money 
influenced great change. 
54 http://www. en gland ru gbv. co m/tw i c ken ha rn/wo rId- ru gbv -museum/rug bv -hi st orv /the-amateur-era/ on 
18/01 /2016 
55 http://www. england ru gbv. co m/twi cken ham/ world- ru rr bv -museum/ru gb v -hi storv /the-amateur-era! 
oni8/0I /2016 
56 http ://www. en gland ru gbv. co m/tw i eke n ham/wo rl cl-ru rrbv -museu m/n1 gby -hi storv/thc-a mate u r-cra/ on 
18/01 /2016 
57 A separate code of the game of rugby with slightly different laws 
58 http :/ /ww1 v. england rugby. co m/twi ckenha m/wo r I cl-ru rr b v -m u scum/rugby-hi storv /the -am at cu r-cra/ on 
18/01 /2016 
59 http ://www. ru gbyfootballhistorv.com/timclinc 1990s.htm on 18/01 /2016 
6° Collins T, "The First Principle of Our Game": The ri se and fa ll of amateurism: 1886-1995, Available at 
http: l/www.cambridgcscholars.com/download/sample/607 16 on 20/01 /2016 
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Australia (SANZAR) to sign a $555 million television deal with Rupert Murdoch 6 1. This 
story shows that indeed sport at its highest and most intense level is being shaped by large 
amounts of money. 
Globally the sports industry has evolved into a multibillion dollar enterprise. PWC conducted 
a study in 2011 of revenues generated in the spmts industry between 2006 and 2015 
(between 2006 and 2010 the numbers are actual while the rest are forecasts) as follows: 
Global Sports Market Revenues 
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In the same year, AT Kearne/2 estimated that the total value of the sports industry was 
between $480-$620 billion63 while in 2014 Plunkett Research Ltd. 64 projected that the sports 
industry would be worth $1 .5 trillion65 In Kenya, the sports industry is projected to grow to 
Kshs 12 billion by the year 201766 . 
6 1 http ://www. th .::!!.uardian. com/sport/20 15/au g/? 5/rob-andrew-wild-west-ru!!.bv-un ion-professional on 
18/01 /2016 
62 Global Management Consulting firm . https://www.atkearney.eom/ 
63 Available at https://www.atkearney.eom/doeuments/ l 0 192/6f46b880-f8d l-4909-9960-ee605bb I f04 on 
18/01 /2016 
64 Provider of industry sector analysis and research, industry trends and industry stati stics. Available at 
https://www. plunkettrcscarch.com/about-us/ on 18/0 1/20 16 
65 https://www .p lun kcttr.::sca rch.com/stati sti csisports-industrv/ onl8/0 1/20 16 
66 A vai !able at 
http: //www. ipsos.co.k.::/N 1 ~ \V B!\SE EXPORTSiK{)/ 14 0422 The%20Dai lv'Yo ?()Nation%20Snwrt%20Companv 
9 6e59c. pdf on 18/01 /2016 
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Why the Legal System Needs to Recognise and Respond to Sports 
This section of the chapter provides an analysis of the above data and a rationale as to why 
the legal system needs to respond to the growth of the sports industry. 
From the first section, it was established that sp01ts does require the rules and the rule maker 
to command authority to give incentive for the players and federation members to abide by 
the rules. Other than administrative structure and procedure, the Sports Act compels sports 
organisations to include in their constitutions provisions for subscription to anti-doping 
policies and rules which conform with the World Anti-Doping Agency Code and compliance 
with the requirements set out in an anti-doping policy and rules of the National Anti-Doping 
Organization as well as subscription to Court of Arbitration for Sports policies and rules 
which conform with requirements set out in Sp01ts Disputes Tribunal policy and rules for 
sports disputes resolution67 . 
The transition of spotts from a pastime to a business gives rise to a myriad of legal issues. It 
is for this reason that it would not be inaccurate to say that indeed spotts law is an overlap of 
the law of contract, taxation, employment, intellectual propetty, competition, private 
international law and criminal law68. However it is the unique application of these fields that 
puts sports law on a league of its own. 
Aspects of pure contract law and labour law have been witnessed in sports disputes in Kenya. 
In Kenya, amateur sportspersons have suffered the brunt of informality prior to the Sports 
Act. In Topi Flot·a Limited v Joel Odhiambo69 an appeal case at the High Colllt, the 
appellant had employed the respondent to harvest flowers at the appellant's farm and aside 
from that would play for the appellant ' s football team. During a football match, the 
respondent was tackled and broke his leg. He brought a suit before the Limuru Law Courts 
(court of first instance) where he sought compensation as an employee of the company for 
negligence on the part of the appellant for not providing protective clothing (shin pads). The 
trial magistrate found that whilst playing football for the appellant's football team the 
respondent is still an employee and the appellant is under statutory obligation to provide 
protective clothing. The appeal court set aside this judgment on the grounds that no evidence 
was adduced to show that the appellant was engaged in football as a professional business, 
67 Second Schedule paragraphs (e) and (I) 
68 Gardiner S ct al , Sporls Law. 4, Routledge, 20 12, 71 
69 C ivil Appeal 707 of2006 
29 
the respondent' s engagement m football was absolutely voluntary and therefore the 
respondent did not establish that he was injured in the course of his employment. 
Furthermore, the respondent did not establish that the appellant was under any statutory or 
contractual duty regarding his engagement in football. First and foremost this appeal case 
took four (4) years to be determined notwithstanding the period oftrial (which is not reported 
as it was a lower court matter) which is a very long time in sports especially for somebody 
who is continuing to play. 
The case of Wilbe.-force Kilibwa v Mumias Sugar Co Limited70, took ten ( l 0) years to be 
determined. The claimant played for the respondent club and sustained an injury during a 
match for the respondent club and it took a decade before the player could receive 
compensation . This is an awfully long time for a dispute in sports; especially involving a 
player as the centre. Another issue that arises is whether a professional sports person fits the 
statutory definition of an employee. The Sports Act defines a professional sports person, to 
the effect that, a person who is under a contract for the engagement and remuneration, 
training for the purpose of a sports competition71. The Employment Act72 defines an 
employee as a person engaged under a contract of service -which differs from a contract for 
services which bind independent contractors-for a period of time73 . Juxtaposing these 
definitions does not conclusively put a sports person under the definition of an employee; 
although the Employment Act does not offer an exception for sports persons. 
In Kilibwa v Mumias Sugar the learned judge contended that professional footballers have 
rights and obligations like any other employees and labour and employment laws apply to 
them . 
Are the obligations of a footballer similar to those of a conventional employee? Another 
question that arises is whether the work of a sportsperson is to train or to take part in 
competition or both? If there is no distinction between training and competition is it a denial 
of an athlete ' s right to not be selected into the competing team? The suffix of the definition 
of a professional sports person in the Act states that the ultimate engagement of the sports 
person is for the purpose of participating in competition . Therefore, at what point does the 
7° Cause Number 2052 of20 II [eKLR] 
71 Section 2 
72 Cap 226 Laws o f Kenya 
73 Section 2 
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work of the athlete begin? At training on a regular basis or at the competition (think of 
doping prohibitions that apply specifically in-competition)? At the point of competition does 
the athlete assume the position of an independent contractor? Who is the employer of a 
professional sports person who plays for a club abroad and also makes his/her national team 
squad? These questions offer a justification as to how contract and labour law are indeed 
fundamental areas of sports law but need specialised and specific application for sports. 
From Halsbury's Laws of England, the sta1ting point for the modern test for ascertainment of 
a contract of employment includes not only the conventional integration or control tests but: 
"The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide 
his own work and skill in the pe1jormance of some service for his master ('mutuality of 
obligation'); 
he agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the pe1jormance of that service he will be subject to 
the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other master ('control'); and 
The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service 
The final classification of an individual now depends upon a balance of all relevant factors, 
fine though that balance sometimes might be, with 'mutuality of obligation' and 'control' 
being seen as the 'irreducible minimum' legal requirements for the existence of a contract of 
employment. The factors taken into consideration may include: the method of payment; any 
obligation to work only for that employer; stipulations as to hours; overtime, holidays etc; 
arrangements for payment of income tax and national insurance contributions how the 
contract may be terminated; whether the individual may delegate work; who provides tools 
and equipment; and who, ultimately, bears the risk of loss and the chance of profit. In some 
cases the nature of the work itself may be an important consideration14 " 
This view was upheld by the judge in Everret Aviation Limited v Kenya Revenue 
Authority75 on the determination of whether freelance pilots hired by the appellants for a 
short period satisfied the definition of an employee. The judge also relies on Whitta){eJ" v 
Minister of National Insurance76 where the holding of the collrt states, inter alia, that 
highly skilled professionals77 such as engineers and surgeons may be employees despite the 
74 Halsbury 's Laws of England, 39, (2014) par. 4 
75 Income Tax Appeal No.2 OF 2009 
76 [1966) 3 ALLER 537 
77 To contextuali zc thi s word it is synonymous with a vocation undertaken for pay 
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little control imposed by their employers. Furthermore, the judge in Everett, in concluding 
that the pilots were employees, stated, as his most impmiant point of consideration, that the 
employer bore the risk of loss and the chance at profit dependent on the failure or success of 
the pilots. The principle in Even-et was also upheld in Ge01·ge Kamau Ndiritu & anothet· v 
Intet·continental Hote1 78 • It suffices to say that the judiciary is lining its jurisprudence on 
contracts of service with this principle. Contextualising this principle in spOii, the 
consideration to be made is whether the success or failure of a particular team has bearing on 
the profit or loss of the business as a whole. This then will direct the answer to the question 
as to whether the work of a professional spmts person is to train or to compete. 
Using the profit maximisation hypothesis, the marginal income from a win has to equals the 
marginal cost of the win 79 • Owners of sports teams are under no obligation to spend what 
they receive therefore a ' small ' team may, in their accounting, have less overheads and 
related costs to acquiring their revenue in turn having a wider profit margin and subsequently 
a good return on investment. This is only practical if the teams maintain sporting success. 
With limited spending on players in a competitive league, sporting success may diminish and 
subsequently fan interest hence reducing revenues from ticket sales, kit sales et al. If 
spending on players increases, then fan interest may be reignited and revenues from ticket 
sales increase but only to a patticular point; the players cost money to buy and maintain80 . 
This assettion, from an external point of view, points very much to the notion that the work 
of a professional sports person in a business is to compete. From the club's point of view, the 
players individually are liabilities (they cost money to maintain) and put together as a team, a 
single asset. With this basis it would be simplistic to argue as the judge did in Kilibwa a 
more meticulous approach ought to be taken bearing in mind these differences. 
The facts and judgment in Fall (Inspectot· of Taxes) v Hitchen 81 provides a more conclusive 
approach to the issues laid afore. The dictum of Pennycuick VC which concludes that the 
respondent is an employee is informed by the following facts: 
"The taxpayer is engaged to work for a minimum period of rehearsals plus 22 weeks, and 
thereafter until the contract is determined by a fortnight's notice on either side; he is engaged 
78 Cause 2347 of20 12 
79 Szymanski S. Ha ll S, Making Money out of Football. /he Business School. Imperial College London,(2003) 
2-3 
80 Szymanski S, Hall S, Making Money out of Football. 5 
8 1 [1973] I All ER 368 
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to work full-time during specified hours for a regular salary; the company has the first call on 
his services, and indeed the exclusive call subject only to this, that their consent to the 
taxpayer performing elsewhere shall not be unreasonably withheld ; and then, again, the 
company provides and owns the gear used by the taxpayer, with one exception . All these 
indicia point to the conclusion that he is not a person who is performing those services in 
business on his own account; and there are really no indicia to the contrary." 
However, the question as to what point the work of a professional sports person begins is still 
not answered . Furthermore, I do not find it entirely incorrect to claim that professional sports 
persons do provide their services on their own account; their performance dictates their 
(individually or through their agents) bargaining power in contract negotiations and exposure 
to endorsement deals. Suppose the judgements in Kilibwa and Fall are harmonised and it is 
the position of the judiciary that the employment laws apply in the same way to ordinary 
employees and to professional spotts persons, there are specific sections of the Employment 
Act that sports teams contradict. Section 5(5) provides that an employer shall pay his 
employees equal remuneration for work of equal value. The concept of work of equal value 
is discussed in David Wanjau Muhoro v 01-Pejeta Ranching Limited82 as 'work which is 
different in content, involving different responsibilities, requiring different skills or 
qualifications.' The concept also denotes every worker, to receive equal pay, for the same or 
similar work83 . !fa professional sports person is an employee then majority ofthe first team 
individuals in professional teams should earn the same salary. It is self-evident this is not the 
case; different players receive different remuneration84 . 
Taxation of sports persons is a growing issue for professional sports in Kenya 85 . The Income 
Tax Act 86(herein after ITA) provides that income from employment or services or any 
amount deemed to be income will be charged income tax87. This without a doubt ropes in 
income and allowances of sp01tspersons. Section 3( I) of the ITA states that the income ought 
to have accrued or have been derived from Kenya. This issue becomes even more complex 
when a professional sports person plays for a club abroad and also represents the national 
82 Cause No . 1813 of2011 [eKLR] 
83 Cause No. 1813 of 20 II , paragraph 190 
84 
See http:/ l>v ww. tc lcf!. rap h. co.uk!sportl football /tca ms/arscna 1/978? 420/ Arscnal-m anagcr-A rscnc-W cngcr-
dcfc nds-his-soc iali st-wagc-plan.html and http://rugbywc 15.com!rug by-pl ayers-sa larics-wages/ on 23/ 1/2016 
85 https://sbot icno. worc!D rcss.com/20 14/03/0 I / is- it-l aw ful-t o-lax-sports-i nco mc-a-l cgal-a nal vs is/ on 23/ 1/2016 
86 Cap 470 Laws of Kenya 
87 Section 3 (2) 
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team i.e. they are residents in more than one jurisdiction. Section 5 of the IT A provides for 
charging income from employment. Pertinent to this study, an employee who is a resident of 
Kenya's worldwide income is deemed to have been derived from Kenya 88. In Kenya the 
requirements for residency are: 
1. A permanent home and presence in Kenya for the year of income 
2. No permanent home but: 
a. Presence in Kenya for a period amounting to 183 days on aggregate 
b. Present in Kenya in that year of income and in each of the two preceding 
years for periods averaging 122 days in each year of income. 
The Kenya Premier League, for example, lasts a period of approximately 90 days 89 . If a 
player is away from Kenya during the off-season or is a new signing to a team then they do 
not satisfy the residency threshold. For income tax, these players are not entitled to the 
personal relief and the insurance relief granted by the Act therefore subjecting them to a 
relatively higher tax liabilit/0 . 
The Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) formulated special 
rules for performing artistes and spm1smen under Article 17 of the Model Convention 91 to 
tax spm1spersons in their area of activity notwithstanding residency. The justification given 
for this double-taxation is due to the fact that sportsmen and artistes, due to the nature of their 
work, are very mobile and may shift residency to tax havens92 . This article is an exception to 
the Article 15 of the Model Convention which is solely for income from employment. This 
distinction fwther points to the earlier observation that even though there is indeed a 
doctrinal overlap between the substantive law on employment and contracts for sportsmen, 
there is factual uniqueness to the workings of the sports industry. Kenya has 11 double tax 
treaties in force with the last one ratified in 198593 . None of these Double tax treaties has any 
regard for income derived from sportspersons meaning any income made by a Kenyan sports 
person anywhere on earth is subject to double tax. This double taxation ofspm1smen may be 
88 Section 5( I) 
89 A va i !able at http ://www .kpl.co.kc/kcnvaltixturcs on 6/2/20 16 
90 Third Schedule Head/\. Income Tax Act 
9 1 OECD Model Convent ion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 
92 Molenaar D, International Arti stes and Sportsmen, Articl e 17 OECD Model, Problem of Double Taxation 
OECD Comment my (20 I 0) avai I able at http ://www.occd.or!!./ctp/tn;atie:;/45 784208.pd I' on 6/2/2016 
93 Available at http ://www. laxwise-consultin !!. .com/intcrnational-tax on 6/2/2016 
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seen as a problem but can also be a tool to incentivise sports growth in a country. If a country 
has minimal tax for sportsmen yet the clubs are well paying then this may be an incentive for 
professional spotts persons to sign for clubs of that country and the reverse is true. 
Violations of sports rules and regulations may also overlap with criminal law and tort law. 
Doping is a growing issue in sports in Kenya with accessibility to modern science, lack of 
education/information, and pressure from coaches to succeed94 . Doping may involve 
substances that are usually legal but prohibited in competition in cettain sports (e.g. alcohol 
in motors ports and archery95 ) and also illegal narcotics like cocaine96 . The process of 
adjudicating these violations also differs from conventional criminal procedure. The standard 
of proof in criminal trials is that of beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, requiring 
substance samples before the coutt with government certification97 • Doping in Spotts is on a 
basis of strict liability; when an adverse finding is made, it is upon the athlete to prove 
Therapeutic Use Exemption (T.U.E) or to mitigate the severity of the punishment98 . 
Furthermore, unlike in criminal procedure where police require a warrant to search property, 
sports persons are subject to random checks to ensure compliance. 
Foul play does occur in spotts from a tackle against the rules, on-field brawls among other 
things. These actions in tort law may be classified as negligence and/or batter/9 . 
Participation in contact sports gives rise to risk of injury from foul play. Establishing tortuous 
liability to the offending player cannot be subject to the same standards as applied to 
individuals on the street. Various risks are present in spotts e.g. unlevelled playing fields and 
dangerous debris on the field , studs on playing boots, negligent/inattentive referees, unclear 
warning protocol following accidents in motorsports 100 etc. The defence of volenti non-fit 
injuria and knowledge of inherent risk are very applicable to these suits of negligence and 
batter/ 01 • This poses the challenge of insurance companies seeking to cover sports persons at 
94 http://www.lawinspon .com/articles/itcm/anti-doping-what-more-needs-to-be-donc-to-combat-dopin g-in-
kenva 
95 WADA Doping List 2015 PI 
96http :/ /www .I a wi nsport. com/spo rtslrugb y lit em/shau n -c leary-banned- for-two-years-a ncr-positive-test- for-
cocaine?category _ id= 154 on 6/2/2016 
97 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Control) Act No. 4 of 1994 
98 A vai I abl e at https ://www. wacla-ama.org/en/questions-answers/strict-1 iabi lity-in-anti-cloping 
99Dictum of Goff L.l in Collins v Wilcock 119841 I WLR 1172 
100 This negligence can give ri se to criminal li ability as in the New Zealand case of Police v Osborne [200 I] 
145 NZLR 31 
101 Rootes vShelton [ 1967] 116 CLR 383-385 
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reasonable premiums. Furthermore, if there is an injured player, and the matter is subject to 
litigation, which has been seen to take a long time, the player might be denied timely 
compensation by the insurance 102 thereby creating a justification for a faster, more 
specialised and alternative mode of dispute resolution . 
It can be deduced that indeed sports has or has the potential to mature into its separate field 
of law. Instances of factual peculiarities creating need for specialised analysis have been 
seen. Elements of spmis regardless of code or discipline have been seen to interrelate 
creating a cetiain harmony in practice and overlapping and many a times contradicting with 
various principles of common law and statutory law and its economic significance too large 
to ignore. Doctrinal overlap is not denied and should not be ignored as it is not ignored in 
other fields of law. It should be noted that certain disputes also require quick settlement but 
they cannot be subject to tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies because they are directly 
concerned with civil and/or criminal wrongs but specifically occur in a sport setting thereby 
calling for a need of reform of the legal system whilst maintaining the social nature and 
structure of spotis. 
102 Schot N, Negli gent Li ability in Sport. Bond University (2005), 8 
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CHAPTER 4 NATURE OF SPORTS DISPUTES AND ATTEMPTS AT 
REFORM 
The previous chapter displayed how various areas of law are not completely tailored to suit 
issues that may arise in the business of sports. This chapter seeks to show the legal issues that 
arose from some disputes that have been decided before the Kenyan cou1ts prior to the Sports 
Act (20 13) and also to show how the Sports Act has attempted to remedy some of the legal 
issues regarding dispute resolution that arise from those disputes. 
Cases before the Sports Act 
a) Republic (through Maurice Odumbe) v Kenya Cricket Association & 2 
otherslill 
Maurice Odumbe brought before the court a matter of Judicial Review seeking orders of 
certiorari and prohibition following a decision, informed by the constitution of the 
International Cricket Council(hereinafter ICC), by the Kenya Cricket Association(hereinafter 
KCA) to ban the applicant from playing cricket competitively. 
Prior to this motion in cotui, allegations of match fixing and misconduct were floated against 
Odumbe. The KCA convened a Tribunal to hear the matter and it is said that the rules of 
natural justice were flouted and the bulk of the witnesses consisted of Mr Odumbe 's former 
girlfriends 104 . 
Mr. Odumbe applied to the court seeking orders of certiorari and prohibition and the 
application was opposed by the KCA and ICC claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction on 
the matter. They relied on the following facts : 
• THAT the ICC and KCA were private bodies 
• THAT there was an alternative remedy already exhausted by Mr. Odumbe 
• THAT the KCA cannot be sued in a Judicial Review matter as it is an 
association. 
103 MISCELLAN EOUS APPLI CATION 1723 OF 2004 
104 h lip :/ i www. bus i nesscla i Iva lh ca. com/1-1 ow -l~u· -c<.l n -courts-in tc' rvcnc-i n-sports-cl i spu te/ -/53 9444 /9 3 69 72/-
/ ilem/0/-/ !!.uqlvcz/-i inclcx .hlml on 25/ 1/2016 
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In support of these facts, the advocate for the ICC and KCA argued that the ICC was a 
company limited by guarantee incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and had no share 
capital and Kenyan cricket players subscribe to it through the Kenya Cricket Association. 
The subscription was contractual making it private therefore not susceptible to Judicial 
Review. Therefore the decision to ban Mr. Odumbe was a denial of a private right hence not 
subject to judicial review. 
The crux of the argument in favour of Mr. Odumbe's case was on the point that the ICC was 
an international body charged with overseeing cricket administration globally and hence its 
decisions would necessarily impact the pub! ic. Furthermore, he argued that the Tribunal 
convened by the ICC and KCA was not private since it exercised quasi-judicial functions. 
In coming up with the judgment, Justice Wendoh considered the following issues: 
• Whether the ICC and KCA are indeed public bodies 
• Whether the alternative remedy sought by the applicant would render this matter res 
judicata 
• Whether the KCA being a club could be sued in its name 
In dealing with the first issue, the judge considers that the ICC was company whose object is 
to advance development, coordinate, regulate and promote cricket globally in co-operation 
with its members. KCA is a member of ICC and their objectives are aligned, save that the 
KCA is a National Club. It was also observed that from the ruling of the Tribunal, Mr. 
Odumbe was bound by the terms of the agreement he made with KCA where he agreed to be 
bound by all the rules, by-laws ad code of conduct at all times hence this created a 
contractual relationship between him and the KCA, and by extension the ICC. In concluding 
this issue, the judge stated that the KCA and ICC, 
"In disciplining the applicant have not pe1jormed any duty of a public nature nor 
were the consequences of the pe1jormance of their duty of a public nature. The 
Respondent's duty to the applicant was strictly within their terms and conditions of 
membership of the club and did not involve the public. Cricket is a sport and depends 
on individual interest. " 
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The decision was private and well within the rules of the KCA and ICC hence the court had 
no jurisdiction to entertain an application for judicial review. 
As to the issue regarding an alternative remedy, the judge found that the decision of the 
Tribunal was not final as it was subject to an official enquiry and ratification by the 
International Cricket Council Executive Board. This led the judge to conclude that this 
scrutiny was supposed to protect the rights of the affected party. The judge also found that 
Mr. Odumbe did exhaust his right of appeal under the contract and hence no remedies were 
available to him under Public Law 105 . 
As to the third issue, the advocate for Mr Odumbe never raised any objection to the fact that 
KCA was wrongly sued and hence the judge struck them off as a party to the suit. 
The decision of the KCA Tribunal stood and Mr. Odumbe was suspended for 5 years as a 
consequence. 
A number of legal issues arise from the circumstances and decision ofthis dispute: 
• Whether Mr. Odumbe denied his right to natural justice 
• Whether the court misdirected itself in concluding the KCA and ICC were not public 
bodies 
• Whether the court analysed the undertaking of the Tribunal in the ambit of Judicial 
Review 
Natural Justice 
It is in the interest of sports bodies or sports in general that disputes are resolved internall/ 06 . 
ln the first attempt at resolving the dispute, the KCA found itself in the dual role of an 
adversary and the adjudicator i.e. the association was aggrieved by an alleged breach, of its 
agreement, by Mr. Odumbe and hence formed a Tribunal to make a decision as to its 
gnevances. 
The principles of natural justice include: 
105 He noted that even though Judicial Review was not an app licab le remedy, Mr Odumbe had a private law 
remedy though none was stated. 
106 Rao S, Rules ofNatural Justi ce as Applied in Sports, 32, Commonwealth Law Bulletin (2006), 247 
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a. Right to a hearing 
b. Rule against bias 
c. Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done 
As to the issues afore, it is not debatable that Mr Odumbe was actually afforded a hearing 
prior to the decision to suspend him. The real issues lie as to whether there was bias in the 
formation of the Tribunal and whether the process of trial did manifest justice. 
The interpretation of the rule against bias lies in two broad classes; firstly where an 
adjudicator can by reason of a personal interest be regarded as being a pa1t and secondly 
whereby reason of a form of interest or by reason of conduct there is a real possibility of 
bias 107. The Court of Appeal in Kenya in James Mwamt·i Gatome & 7 othet·s v R 108 
quoted Blackburn J in Republic v Rand 109 where he holds, inter alia, that if any adjudicator 
holds a primary interest no matter how small in the subject matter he/she is disqualified in 
making a judgment of the same. The Tribunal was formed by the KCA; which was the 
offended party and was chaired by Justice Ebrahim; a former cricketer in Zimbabwe and a 
long standing cricket administrative official in Zimbabwe 110 . Ebrahim was for all intents and 
purposes an official in a rival cricket administrative body; perhaps an interest in seeing the 
demise of Kenyan Cricket which had been rather successful from I 996 111 . The bias in this 
situation is seen as the KCA is the prosecutor of the matter also appointed a Tribunal to hear 
the matter. This particular element was not considered in the judgment of the application for 
review. Justice Wendoh sought not to interfere or to inquire into the conduct of the KCA in 
setting up the Tribunal in a bid to maintain the sanctity of the contract between the KCA, 
ICC and Odumbe. In Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Gt·eat B.-itain 112 Denning L.J states, 
"Although the jurisdiction of a domestic Tribunal is founded on contract, express or 
implied, nevertheless the parties are not .fi'ee to make any contract they like. There 
are important limitations imposed by public policy. The Tribuna/must, for instance, 
observe the principles ofnatural justice. " 
107 Halsbury ' s Laws of England. 61 , (20 I 0), par. 631 
108 Civil Application No. 25 OF 2007 
109 [1966]1 L.R . QB230 
11 0 Available at http :!/www.cspncricin fo.co m/zimbabwc/contcntiplavcr/55 398.html on 26/ 1/2016 
111 See hltp:iiwww·.espncric in ku:om/mal!.az ine/content/storv/7 84 5 19.html on 26/1 /2016 
11 2 [1952]1 AllER 1175 
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Justice Wendoh did not put on a balancing scale the freedom of contract and the rights of the 
aggrieved party. In Bt·een v Amalgamated Engineel"ing Union(A.E.U) 113 the court held, 
inter alia, that despite the fact that sp01ts federations derive their power from contract, the 
rules form a legislative code to be obeyed by its members and just like any other legislation 
should be subject to judicial control like any stah1te passed by parliament. These two 
holdings are more alike to the Odumbe case than the ones quoted in the judgment. 
Whether KCA and ICC satisfied tlte tlzreshold of being public bodies 
It is not debatable as to whether the ICC was a private company and the KCA a private club. 
This was established in the evidence tendered before the court and was sufficient for the 
judge to conclude that they were not public bodies; hence were not under the ambit of 
judicial review. 
Judicial review will apply against anybody who performs a public duty; this applies to 
private Tribunals that have acquired a public concern 11 4. A public body is defined by the 
Intet·pretations and Geneml Pt·ovisions Ace 15 as a government or any department thereof, 
a local authority or any authority, board, commission, committee or other body, whether 
paid or unpaid, which is invested with or is performing, permanently or temporarily, any 
function of a public nature 11 6. This final section of this decision reads the same as Section 6 
(3) (b) of the United Kingdom ' s Human Rights Act (1998). In this case, in order to establish 
whether KCA and ICC were public bodies it must be demonstrated that they carried out 
functions of a public nature. As a starting point to determine whether a body is carrying out a 
public function , the courts have tended to explore whether the action was funded publicly or 
privately. The court in R (on the application of Weaver) v London and Quadmnt 
Housing Tmst117 contends that aside from this, there needs to be a consideration as to 
whether the functions of the body are private in form but public in substance. In R.D Shetty 
v The International Ait·pot·t Authot·ity of Indian & Othet·s 118 the court set out criteria in 
establishing whether a body is a public body as follows (enlisted are those relevant to this 
argument) : 
11 3 [1971] I All E. R. 1148 
114 Pro f. Lumumba PLO, An Outline of Judicial Review in Ke1~va, I. UON, 1999, 12 
11 5 Cap 2 Laws of Kenya 
11 6 Section 3 (I) 
117 [2009] All ER (D) 179 
118 
[ 1979] I S.C.R. I 042 
41 
a. "where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost the 
entire expenditure of the Corporation, that fact would afford some indication 
ofthe corporation being impregnated with Governmental character; 
b. whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status conferred by the State; 
c. whether the body has deep and pervasive State control" 
For the ICC, it was a company incorporated outside Kenya and its shares were limited by 
guarantee. The KCA was a member of this company and bound by its objects. The Kenyan 
government has been funding cricket in Kenya and at a point disbanded the board of the 
KCA citing financial mismanagement 11 9 • The government is under no obligation to inte1fere 
with the use of funds by an association/society not unless it is providing the funds or the 
association is big enough to have public imp01iance. This shows that the first criterion has 
been fulfilled. 
The KCA was the only body recognized globally in the administration of cricket in Kenya. 
No other body would purport to create a team of Kenyan cricket players and call it the Kenya 
National Cricket team 120 . This was recognised by the Ministry of Sp01is and Culture (as it 
was then) therefore affording the KCA monopoly, supported by the State, over the 
administration and growth of cricket in Kenya. This assertion covers the second and third 
criteria. The decision of the Tribunal then had force in the public sphere as Mr. Odumbe 
could not play cricket anywhere in Kenya and globally. 
It has been established indeed that the formation of the KCA was private in form through the 
agreements by which it was bound. It is not debatable that the substance of it actions 
assumed a public nature; funding from the government, monopoly in the administration of 
cricket countrywide, using the national flag and name in its team to represent the country in 
g lobal competitions. The judge erred on his analysis of the law in denying the fact that KCA 
was a public body thereby denying Mr Odumbe the remedy ofjudicial review. 
11 9 http :/iwww.espncricinfo.com/k.:nval<.:ontenUstorv/145277. html on 27/ 1/2016 
120 See Societies Act (Cap I 08 Laws or Kenya) Section II (2)(1) 
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(.\ 
b) Isaiah Kiplagat & 2 Others v Eric Keter 121 
This case arises from an application by Isaiah Kiplagat (I 51 Applicant), David Okeyo (2"d 
Applicant) and Kenya Amateur Athletic Association (3'd Applicant), collectively the 
Applicants, for stay of execution of the order of the High Court, to include Eric Keter 
(Respondent) in the Kenya Athletics team (the team) to the Olympic Games, pending the 
lodging and hearing of an intended Appeal from the ruling and order of the High Court. 
In his plaint to the High Court122, the Respondent claimed that he had maliciously and 
fraudulently been excluded from representing Kenya in the 400 m hurdles at the Olympics of 
the year 2000 despite the fact that in the determinative period he had satisfied the time 
requirements (annexed in the ev idence) and ranking requirements of the 3'd Applicant in the 
All Africa Games and the national Olympic Games trials. The Respondent sought relief by 
way of a mandatory injunction to compel the 3'd Applicant to include him in the team. 
Appearance was entered for the 3'd Respondent seeking the stay of this suit and in support of 
this claim, the 3'd Respondent quoted its constitution that provided, inter alia: 
"All disputes between the K.A.A.A (3'd Respondent) and any athlete shall be 
submitted to an arbitration panel appointed by the K.A .A.A Executive 
Committee. The decision of the arbitration panel under this Section shall be 
final and binding on all pmties. No right of appeal willlie 123 ." 
The parties came to a consensus that the application by the Respondent for a mandatory 
injunction and the 3"1 Applicant's application for stay be heard together. The Association 
focused on its application and did not challenge the facts deponed by the Respondent. 
On the application for stay by the 3'd Applicant, the trial judge held that the clause 
aforementioned was void as it offended the principles of natural justice for reason that the 3'd 
Applicant would assume the role of the prosecutor and judge at the same time. Their 
application for stay was hence denied hence this appeal. 
The 3'd Applicant's appeal was on the ground that this clause 21 (ii) bound the Respondent 
since he participated in the Olympic Game trials and that it formed an arbitration agreement 
under the Arbitration Act 124 which under section 6(1) required the Respondent's plaint to be 
121 Civi l Application Number 239 of2000 
122 ll.C.C.C. Nu mber 1223 of2000 
123 Clause 21 (ii) of the K.A.A.A Consti tution 
124 Cap 49 Laws of Kenya 
43 
' ~ , 
stayed. The Court of Appeal on this point held that clause 21 (ii) of the 3 rd Applicant's 
Constitution was in conflict with the principles of natural justice and that it does not satisfy 
the threshold set in Sections 4(2) and (3) of the Arbitration Act. 
Another ground of appeal by the 3'd Applicant was that a mandatory injunction cannot be 
granted on mere affidavit evidence alone. The com1 held that it is so only if the evidence is 
challenged and in this case the 3'd Applicant did not challenge the evidence at trial. The court 
concluded that the intended appeal was frivolous and upheld the order of the High Court. 
This case does not have many points of contention though when juxtaposed with the Odumbe 
case, we see various inconsistencies in 'sports' jurisprudence. There are a number of 
similarities, the courts ' jurisdiction was invoked in a bid to temper the internal decisions of 
the respective associations, the associations dispute resolution mechanisms showed little 
regard for the rights of the athlete in the formation of the Tribunal and the recourse upon its 
decision. The differences lay in the legal avenues explored by the person aggrieved by the 
decision of the internal Tribunal. Maurice Odumbe sought a remedy in judicial review while 
Eric Keter sought an equitable remedy in the form of a mandatory injunction either requiring 
different forms of presentation . For judicial review, judicial authority insists on the proof of 
a public body making a decision of a public nature and does not insist on the substance of the 
decision but the process by which it was arrived at. For a mandatory injunction the claimant 
needs to show, with a probability of success, that without the injunction irreparable damage 
that cannot be settled by an award for damages will occur125 . True to it the circumstances of 
the athletes were different at the time of the decisions of the Tribunal (Keter would miss the 
Olympics that were in a month and Odumbe would lose a source of income for 5 years) and 
the avenues sought by their respective advocates were sufficient. 
The courts' involvement in the dealings of sports federations especially regarding the rights 
of athletes cannot be denied via a contract/constitution. However, the courts should not 
. I . . f I .c: d · 116 mtervene on t1e executive runnmg o t1e 1e eratton-
125 Gic ll a v Cassman Brown [I 973] EA358 
126 Garcia B, From Regulation to Governance and Representation: Agenda Setting and the EU Involvement in 
Sport, 5 Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 2007, 22 
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Remedies brought by the Sports Act (2013) 
There are a number of provisions of the sports act that enhance the dispute resolution process 
for sports in Kenya. 
Definitions 
The first point of focus as to how the Sp01ts Act has mitigated dispute resolution lies in 
Section 2; the definition/interpretation section. The Act has defined a ' national sp01ts 
organisation ' as an umbrella body responsible for all sports or for a particular sport. This 
reduces the chances of litigation as to whether a national sp01ts organisation is a public body 
b . . . . d d b I J? 7 or not; ecause 1t 1s, as 1t requ1res man atory en orsement y t 1e government to operate - , 
possess a monopoly over the administration over a particular sport 128, subject to inspection at 
any time129 and its management changed by the Cabinet Secretary130 . 
The definition of a professional sp01ts person is also an important addition of the Sports Act. 
The Act mandates that there ought to be a contract and remuneration. This will reduce 
potential litigation as to who is a professional sp01ts person and what can be considered 
professional sports. 
Establishments 
The most important establishment the Sports Act makes with regard to dispute resolution is 
the Sports Dispute Tribunal. The Tribunal is established in Section 56 and will consist of: 
a. A chairperson who is qua lified to be a Judge of the High Court and 
b. at least two other members who shall 
be advocates of the High Court of Kenya with at least 7 years of experience 
11 have experience in legal matters relating to sports or have been involved 111 
sport in any capacity 
c. At least two and not more than six other person who have experience in sport, in any 
capacity, of I 0 years. 
127 Section 4 7( I) read with Section 65 
128 Sect ion 48 
129 Section 53 




These members have a 5 year term and can be reappointed for one other tenn giving them 
security of tenure 131• Furthermore, the Tribunal is independently appointed by the Judicial 
Service Commission (hereinafter JSC) and sports organisations only serve on a consultative 
I'? basis o_ . 
The Tribunal's jurisdiction is on appeals against decisions made by national spmis 
organisations whose rules specifically allow for appeals to be made to the Tribunal on that 
issue (including disciplinary decisions, appeals against not being selected to a Kenyan team 
or squad; ring a bell?), other sports related dispute that all parties agree to refer to the 
Tribunal and that the Tribunal agrees to hear and appeals from decisions of the Registrar 
under the Spmts Act. 
The Second Schedule of the Act provides for matters that ought to be included in the 
constitutions of sp01ts organisations including, pertinent to this study, subscription to Court 
of Arbitration for Spmts policies and rules which conform to the requirements of the 
Tribunal policy and that selection of the Kenyan team and technical personnel shall be done 
in good time. 
These laws are an attempt at mitigating the nature of the disputes analysed above. 
Furthermore, the requirement that the Tribunal requires lawyers who have an understanding 
of or exposure to sports is a plus. In Chapter 2 we discussed the theory of cultural relativism 
whereby we established sports as a construct of culture and a person outside a particular way 
of life/culture will not understand or appreciate fully the merits of the culture. It is therefore 
an important step by the legislature to recognise that lawyers with adequate exposure to both 
the law and sports are best suited to handle sports disputes. 
With regards to the right to access to justice, in chapter 2 we saw the court in Dry Associates 
v Capital Marl<ets & Another133 indicates that access to justice, among other things, entails: 
• Enshrinement of rights in the law- The Sports Act does not explicitly spell out the 
rights of an athlete however, implicitly; one has the right to be selected to a Kenyan 
team and may air out this grievance to the Tribunal. 
• Awareness of and understanding of the law- The Sports Act does not compel any 
athlete to go through basic legal training to understand their limitations and rights. 
13 1 Section 57 (I) 
132 Section 56 (2) 
133 Petition 328 of201 I 
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• Equal right to the protection of those rights by the law enforcement agencies, easy 
access to the justice system and availability of physical legal infrastructure- The 
Tribunal allows for an impartial avenue for athletes to seek legal remedy. 
• Affordability oflegal services- ADR tends to be more cost-effective than litigation 134 
• Expeditious disposal of cases- The Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body that uses ADR 
methods which have been deemed to be quick, flexible and private 135 
The Loopholes 
The first loophole, relevant to this study, found in the Sports Act lies in the section on 
appointments to the Tribunal. There is the use of the phrase involved in sport in any capacity 
as a condition for the appointment of the other (than the chairperson) members of the 
Tribunal. This means any mediocre sports fan fits the description of appointment. 
The next loophole lies in the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The appellate jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal is subject to the rules of the sports organisation and the decisions of the Registrar136• 
The subordination of the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal with regard to the decisions of 
sports organisations is one of the problems that the parties faced in Maurice Odumbe and 
El"ic Kete.-. Furthermore, the act does not compel the sports organisations to observe the 
rules of natural justice. 
Another loophole or point of contention in the establishment of the Tribunal is that it is in 
essence a part of the judiciary and for this reason, from a purely procedural point of view, its 
decisions cannot be appealed in CAS 137 . It acquires its status in the Judiciary from the 
Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0) as a local tribunal established by an Act of Parliament138 . This 
therefore might cause potential parties to a dispute eschew from presenting the dispute to the 
Tribunal and might soon render the Tribunal irrelevant. As to the appeals from the decisions 
of the Registrar, CAS has no jurisdiction to hear the dispute owing to the fact that they 
cannot interfere with the decision of a government body. 
134 Kariuki M and Kariuki F, Access to Justice and Development in Kenya. 4 
135 Kariuki M and Kariuki F. Access to Justice and Development in Kenya. 4 
136 Section 59(a)(c) 
137 Sec http :/ /sportin!:!.consu ltan cv .com/2 0 I 5!021 14/thc-sports-di sputcs-tri bunal-of-k c.n va-how-to-managc-and -
cxcecd-ex pectations/ on 28/ I /20 16 
138 Article 169 (d) 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The essence of this chapter is to conclude the aims of this study which were: 
• To assess the nature and the autonomy of sport and to demonstrate the need for the 
legal system to respond to it. 
• To assess some of the landmark disputes prior to the Sports Act. 
• To demonstrate the suitability of internal and institutional alternative dispute 
resolution framework laid out by the Sports Act 
Conclusions 
a) Sports Law is a growing field of its own 
From Chapter 3, we established that conventional fields of law as practiced in Kenya through 
various decided cases are not conclusive as to the determination of legal issues that occur or 
may occur in sports. This study found that, for example, the Employment Act and the 
Income Tax Act are vague as to the dealings of sports with regards to professional athlete 
employment status, professional athlete remuneration and the tax liability of professional 
athletes plying their trade in more than one jurisdiction. This poses the risk of professional 
athletes being taxed twice and facing the tax rate of a contractor. Fwthermore, this vagueness 
of the law is a potential for long winding litigation owing to the fact that these issues cannot 
be determined by quasi-judicial bodies. 
b) Internal Dispute Resolution for Sports needs oversight 
From the Odumbe and Keter cases, it was seen that internal tribunals are likely to ignore the 
athlete's right to natural justice. Sports bodies are inclined to protect the sanctity of their 
institution ' s dealings from the interference by the court however it was found that certain 
disciplinary hearings; those that would ban the athlete from their source of income need an 
avenue for review due to the gravity of their sanctions. 
c) The claim to Natural Justice is Limited in sports 
Everybody has a right to be heard before conviction and freedom from bias in the process. It 
was found that spotts organisations are likely to flout these principles in their internal 
tribunals . However, certain circumstances limit this right for example the strict liability 




a) An amendment of the Employment Act to harmonise the definition of an employee 
with that of a professional spotis person. This is for the reason that sports teams will 
be compelled to offer adequate insurance to their team members and an opportunity 
for decent pay. Subsequently an amendment to the Income Tax Act to reduce income 
tax on sports persons to incentivise investment in local spotis. 
b) An amendment of the Sports Act regarding the establishment of the Tribunal. The 
tribunal should be established by one of the sports institutions in Kenya and not the 
Act so as it is no longer a part of the Judiciary. Speculatively, as the Rules are yet to 
be passed, the Rules of the Tribunal may expressly permit appeals to CAS however 
this point is still arguable and may be a source of future conflict within a sports 
organisation. 
c) Power for the sports institutions to supervise internal hearings in spotis organisations 
to ensure equitable procedure and judgments ensue. 
d) An emphasis by the sports institutions for sports organisations to apply facilitative 
methods of dispute resolution, internally, before they engage in determinative and 
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